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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
The probate court, on the authority of In re Johanson's Estate,"
concluded that the proceeds passing to the present decedent had been
taxed in the estate of the husband and were exempt from being taxed
as passing to the children. The supreme court set aside a portion of
the order approving the final report and decree of distribution with
the instruction to recompute the tax, and declared that the reasoning
for the holding in the Johanson case, supra, did not apply to exempt
insurance proceeds.
In the Johanson case, the state claimed that the amount listed as
an exemption in the estate of the second decedent should have been
reduced by the amount of the exemption allowed to Class A bene-
ficiaries in the estate of the first decedent. The court, however, held
that the entire amount of the estate, including the exemptions was
considered in determining the amount of the tax for each bracket in
Class A and thus no portion of the estate had escaped taxation.
The effect of the decision in the Johanson case would seem to have
been abrogated by the recent statutory enactment16 which provides
that "the proportion of deduction chargeable against and any exemp-
tion allowed against the property previously taxed in the estate of the
prior decedent" must be excluded from that portion of the property
previously taxed. In the Gagan case the court declared that the exemp-
tion allowed to the estate of the first decedent had no part in deter-
mining the amount of inheritance tax. The court thus reached a result
intended by the subsequent 1953 amendment.'
GUST A. LEDAKIS
TORTS
Wanton Misconduct-Contributory Negligence not a Defense.
Contributory negligence is not a defense to wanton misconduct. The
first clear statement of this rule in Washington was pronounced recently
in Adkinson v. Seattle.' The defendant, in the course of sewer and
water main construction, left, on a highway, a pile of dirt three to six
feet high which entirely covered one side of the heavily traveled
arterial, with no barriers and no more than three flare pots, on a dark
and rainy night. The plantiff's decedent was speeding when he struck it.
Wanton misconduct is a middle ground between wilful misconduct
and negligence. A wanton act is one performed with a reckless in-
1538 Wn. 2d 492, 230 P. 2d 614 (1951).
16 L. 1953, c. 137, § 1. See Harsch, Taxation, 28 WAsH. L. REV. 197 (1953).
17 Supra, note 16.
1 42 Wn.2d 676, 258 P.2d 461 (1953).
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difference to the clear probability than injurious consequences will
result; it implies indifference as to whether an act will injure another
in the face of a high degree of probability that it will. Wanton mis-
conduct differs from negligence only as a matter of degree, but this
difference of degree is so marked as to amount to a substantially
different kind of conduct, i.e. conduct more closely akin to wilfulness
than to negligence. Nevertheless, distinguishing between wanton mis-
conduct and negligence has proved difficult in practice.2 The existence
of wanton misconduct is a jury question.
Res Ipsa Loquitur3 in Malpractice Suits. Before an operation on
his vocal cords by the defendant, the plaintiff possessed a "perfectly
fine and normal" voice. After the operation his voice was hoarse, low-
pitched, and difficult to understand. The court held that res ipsa loqui-
tur was not applicable.'
In malpractice suits, res ipsa loquitur can be applied only when the
cause of the injury is clear to a layman. Where the cause of the injury
is a matter for expert opinion, res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable. Although
any layman could detect the bad condition of plaintiff's voice, the cause
was not within the certain knowledge of laymen, and therefore, re-
mained a medical question.
Although this is the first clear statement, by the Washington court,
of the limit upon use of res ipsa loquitur in malpractice suits, it is
consistent with previous Washington cases. Washington has permitted
use of res ipsa loquitur where it is clear even to a layman that the cause
of the injury was the negligence of the defendant.' On the other hand,
Washington has consistently 'held that negligence on the part of a
physician or surgeon cannot be inferred merely from a bad result.
0
2 Wittstruck v. Lee, 62 S.D. 290, 252 N.W. 874, 92 A.L.R. 1361 (1934). The South
Dakota court overruled Carlson v. Johnke, 57 S.D. 544, 234 N.W. 25, 72 A.L.R.
1352 (1931), in which they had held, only three years before, that contributory
negligence was not a defense to wanton misconduct; reasoning was that, although
academically acceptable, the rule in practice had resulted in the importation into SouthD kota law of the doctrine of comparative negligence. The Washington court cited
the cases, but apparently was not impressed by the difficulty found by the South
Dakota court.
a For comment on application and effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Washington, see
27 WAsH. L. Rav. 147 (1952).
' Nelson v. Murphy, 42 Wn2d 737,258 P.2d 472 (1953).
5 Olsen v. Weitz, 37 Wn.2d 70, 221 P.2d 537 (1950) ; Helland v. Bridenstine, 55
Wash. 470, 104 Pac. 626 (1909). Both cases involved a broken bone so improperly
joined that it was apparent to a layman's eye. Wharton v. Warner, 75 Wash. 470, 135
Pac. 235 (1913), a twelve-inch spring left in patient's uterus. Cornwell v. Sleicher, 119
Wash. 573, 205 Pac. 1959 (1922), patient infected with gonorrhea as result of defendant
using an unsterilized instrument.0 Derr v. Bonney, 38 Wn.2d 678, 231 P2d 637 (1951) ; Crouch v. Wyckoff, 6 Wn.2d
273, 197 P.2d 339 (1940) ; Lorenz v. Booth, 84 Wash. 550, 145 Pac. 31 (1915) ; Hollis
v. Ahlquist, 142 Wash. 333, 251 Pac. 871 (1927).
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Building Codes-Retroactive Effect-Standard of Care. Where a
building code contains a clear indication that it is to apply to buildings
constructed prior to its enactment, the court will give it that effect.
This was the rule pronounced by the Washington court as they upheld
a finding of negligence for the violation of a building code enacted
subsequent to the construction of defendant's building.! The court
found the intent of the code clear, explaining, "This opinion is impelled
not only by the broad, all inclusive language, employed i.e., 'all stair-
ways' and 'all buildings, but from the stated object of the code and
the guide for its construction that its 'provisions shall in every instance
be held to be the minimum requirements adopted for the promotion of
the public health, safety, comfort or welfare'."8 The necessary conclu-
sion is that building owners subject to the Seattle building code or
codes of similar wording may no longer rest secure in the age of their
structures, but must meet the standard of care required by the most
recent code enactment.
JOHN PIPER
Person Repairing Disabled Car on Highway-Standard of Care.
Recent Washington Supreme Court decisions would indicate that an
individual standing upon the highway for the purpose of repairing a
disabled automobile is a pedestrian within the meaning of RCW
46.60.290.
In the case of Gooschin v. Ladd,' the court had held that the duty
of a pedestrian did not apply to one who is standing upon the highway
for the purpose of repairing a disabled automobile. This decision,
however, was based upon an interpretation of an earlier statute which
fixed the duty of a pedestrian, but did not define what a pedestrian
was."0 RCW 46.60.290, passed in 1937, was held to extend to all per-
sons afoot upon the highways."-
The effect of the later statute upon the status of one afoot on the
highway for the purpose of repairing an automobile was presented in
Bergstrom v. Ove.11 The car in which the plaintiff was riding had slid
off the right hand side of the road, and while engaged in an attempt to
7 Fay v. Allied Stores Corp., 143 Wash. Dec. 473, 262 P2d 189 (1953).
s Id. at 476, 262 P.2d at 191.
9 177 Wash. 625, 33 P.2d 653 (1934).
10 L. 1927, c. 309, § 41.
it Nylund v. Johnston, 19 Wn.2d 163, 141 P.2d 863 (1943).
12 39 Wn.2d 78, 234 P.2d 548 (1951).
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push the car back onto the highway, the plaintiff was struck by the
car of the defendant. The court held that an instruction that it was
the duty of a-pedestrian to proceed upon the sidewalk where one is
provided, otherwise to proceed upon the left hand side of the roadway,
and upon meeting an oncoming vehicle to step to the left and clear of
the highway, was a correct instruction upon the duty of the plaintiff.
In this opinion, the court while not specifically overruling Gooschin v.
Ladd indicated that it was no longer controlling due to the change in
statute.
In the most recent case, Ralston v. Veesey,18 the duty of a pedestrian
was imposed upon the plaintiff who had stopped upon the right hand
side of the roadway in order to pump up a tire. The court, in holding
that the trial court did not err in instructing that the plaintiff was sub-
ject to the duty of a pedestrian, cited both the Bergstrom case and the
case of Myers v. West Coast Fast Freight.1" The Myers case is doubtful
authority as the failure of the plaintiff to discharge the duty of a
pedestrian was not an issue upon appeal, and the instruction of the trial
court became the rule of the case.
Assuming the rule to be established that an individual- standing
upon the highway while repairing an automobile is a pedestrian, the
next question is the weight which is to be given to the violation of a
pedestrian statute by the plaintiff. In this regard there appears to be
some confusion. The court in Discharger v. Seattle" held that it was
error for the trial court to instruct that violation of a Seattle City
Ordinance was negligence per se. The court pointed out that the plain-
tiff was entitled to an instruction that such violation was not negligence
if it would have been impractical or impossible for the plaintiff not
to have violated the ordinance. The problem of a contributory negli-
gence in such a situation was held to be a matter of fact for the jury.
In the later Bergstrom case, the court held that the defendant was
entitled to an instruction that if the plaintiff had violated RCW
46.60.290 this would be negligence in and of itself. In Ralston v.
Veesey the instruction upon the status of the plaintiff did not impose
negligence per se as in the Bergstrom case, .ut did impose a greater
degree of care because of the right of way given to automobiles, and a
duty to maintain a constant lookout to avoid danger.
It is submitted that the instruction given in the Ralston case is pre-
18 143 Wash. Dec. 69, 260 P2d 324 (1953).
1442 Wn.2d 524, 256 P.2d 840 (1953).
1a 25 Wn2d 306, 171 P2d 205 (1946).
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ferable to the instruction to which the defendant was held to be
entitled in the Bergstrom case. The imposition upon the plaintiff of
the duty of a pedestrian, coupled with an instruction that if this statu-
tory duty were not discharged the plaintiff was negligent as a matter
of law, would constitute an almost insurmountable hurdle to recovery.
The rigor of this rule can be overcome, as it was in the Discharger case,
by allowing the jury to consider the reasonableness of the statute
violation as viewed from a consideration of all of the factors surround-
ing the accident.
Libel-Conditional Privilege. The case of Ward v. Painters' Local
Union No. 30011 presents an interesting problem concerning the scope
of a conditional privilege in a libel action. The plaintiff was the finan-
cial secretary of the defendant Union. The defendant published an
alleged schedule of shortages showing a comparison of the expenditures
made during the time that the plaintiff was in office with the expendi-
tures for a comparable period during which the office was managed
by trustees. The court held that the matter published was libelous
per se as it tended to harm the plaintiff in his occupation, but that the
publication was subject to a conditional privilege in that the members
of the Union had a common interest in the subject matter." The
question in the case then became one of scope of the privilege. The
court pointed out that the scope of the privilege could be exceeded
either by malice on the part of the publisher, or by the publishing of
the question of malice, the court held that the trial court had erred
in not instructing the jury to consider the good faith of the publisher.
In regard to the publishing of the matter to other than union members,
the court pointed out that the scope of the privilege would be exceeded
if the schedule were mailed to other than union members, the court
pointed out that the scope of the privilege would be exceeded if the
schedule were mailed to other than union members, or if the actual
mimeographing and mailing of the schedule were done by persons not
members or employees of the union. It would therefore appear that
one having a conditional privilege acts at his peril when he has libelous
material mimeographed br mailed by other than those having a com-
mon interest in the material published. Certainly this interpretation
places a severe limitation upon the effective application of the condi-
tional privilege in the State of Washington.
10 41 Wn.2d 859, 252 P.2d 253 (1953).
17 Bass v. Mathews, 69 Wash. 214, 124 Pac. 384 (1912).
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Loss of Consortium-Wife has no Action. Can the wife of an indi-
vidual covered by Workmen's Compensation recover in a tort action
for loss of consortium caused by the negligence of her husband's em-
ployer? No, answered the Washington Supreme Court in Ash v. S. S.
Mullen, Inc",
Although there existed at common law a right of action which could
be brought by the husband,"9 no action for loss of consortium could be
maintained by the wife. RCW 26.16.160 removed civil disabilities
imposed upon a wife which are not imposed upon the husband. This
statute, however, was interpreted to mean only that a wife could bring
no action in her own name without joining her husband in cases where
a right of action existed at common law. It did not, in the court's
opinion, confer upon the wife any new rights of action."° This decision
has introduced a note of confusion into the law applicable to this point
due to its apparent contradiction of an earlier case which allowed a
wife to recover in an alienation of affection action for loss of her hus-
band's consortium. In Beach v. Brown,21the court held that the removal
of the wife's civil disabilities, removed the common law denial of her
right to maintain an action in tort for loss of consortium.
EUGENE H. SAGE
Liability of Charitable Non-Profit Hospitals to Paying Patients. Held, in Pierce v.
Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Assn., 143 Wash. Dec. 148, 260 P.2d 765 (1953),
"It is our opinion that a charitable non-profit hospital should no longer be held immune
from liability for injuries to paying patients caused by the negligence of employees of
the hospital. Our previous decisions holding to the contrary are hereby overruled." The
case is noted at 12 U. oF CIN. L. REv. 489 (1953). 42 Gao. L. J. 166 (1953), 32 TEXAS
L. REV. 476 (1954). See Comment, 16 WASH. L. REv. 245 (1941).
Negligence-Duty of a Favored Driver at an Uncontrolled Intersection. Three cases
were decided under the right of way statute. RCW 46.60.150. Massengale v. Svangren,
41 Wn.2d 758, 252 P.2d 317 (1953), involved a collision between two automobiles
approaching an intersection at approximately the same time and speed. The court
asserted that the favored driver "had the right to assume" that the disfavored driver
would observe him and yield the right of way. The opinion refused to "decide whether
the favored driver had a duty to look to his left." However, in the later case of Bos v.
Default, 42 Wn.2d 641, 257 P.2d 775 (1953), the court indicated that the favored driver
would have a duty to observe an automobile approaching from the left which had
already entered the intersection. A further limitation upon the Massengale doctrine
was indicated in Sebastian v. Rayment, 42 Wn.2d 108, 254 P.2d 456 (1953). Here, the
trial court found speeding on the part of the favored driver at the time of the collision
Is 143 Wash. Dec. 319, 261 P.2d 118 (1953).
19 Lansburg & Bros. v. Clark, 127 F.2d 331 (C.A. D.C. 1942).
2 0 Accord Sheard v. Oregon Electric Co., 137 Ore. 341, 2 P2d 916 (1931) ; Howard
v. Verdigris Valley Electric Co-op., 201 Okla. 504, 207 P.2d 784 (1949).
2120 Wash. 266, 55 Pac. 46 (1898).
19541
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
to be contributory negligence. The Supreme Court sustained this finding, though the
dissent noted that there was nothing in the record to indicate that the excessive speed
of the favored driver contributed to the collision. Comparison of these cases would
seem to indicate that the favored driver at an uncontrolled, non-arterial intersection is
under no duty to maintain a lookout for a disfavored driver who has not preceeded the
favored driver into the intersection. It would also appear that speeding upon the part
of the favored driver will act strongly as a bar to recovery. The questions raised are
discussed in Comment, 29 WASH. L. Rav. 73 (1954).
Host-Guest Statute-Promise to Pay for Transportation. McUne v. Fuqua, 42
Wn.2d 65, 253 P.2d 632 (1953), was an action for injuries sustained while the plaintiff
was a passenger in the car of the defendant. The issue presented was whether a mere
promise to pay for the transportation was sufficient to constitute the plaintiff a paying
passenger rather than a guest under RCW 46.08.080. The court, adopting the analysis
presented in Richards, Another Decade Under the Guest Statute, 24 WASH. L. REv.
101 (1949), held that if the expectation of benefit motivates the furnishing of trans-
portation, the host-guest statute does not apply.
Defendants Severally Liable-Plaintiff Must Apportion Damage. In Mass v. Perkins,
42 Wn.2d 38, 253 P.2d 427 (1953), he plaintiff sought damages for seepage from the
property of the defendants. Each of the two defendants owned land adjacent to the
land of the plaintiff. The trial court dismissed the action when the plaintiff was unable
to show what portion of the total damage was caused by each of the defendants. This
was affirmed. Unless the defendants have a common design, or are acting in concert,
they are severally liable and the plaintiff must show the share of damage caused by
each. A seemingly more satisfactory rule appears in S & C Clothing Co. v. United
States Trucking Corp., 215 N.Y.S. 349 (1926). The case was decided under N.Y.
CIv. PRAC. Acr. § 213 (repealed by L. 1949, c. 247) which established that where doubt
existed as to which of two defendants caused damage, plaintiff could join both in an
action. Once liability was established, the burden of apportioning damages was placed
upon the defendants.
Negligence-Scope of Risk-Liability of School District. McLeod v. Grant County
School Dist., 42 Wn.2d 316, 252 P.2d 369 (1953), was an action brought on behalf of a
twelve year old girl, raped during a noon recess in a small room adjoining the school
gymnasium. The noon hour was supervised, but at the time of the act, the teacher in
charge was not present. The trial court's action in sustaining a demurrer was held to
be error. The court pointed out that the question was not whether this specific harm
could have been foreseen, but whether the harm fell within a general field of danger
which should have been anticipated. The question of negligence was for the jury. The
case is discussed under Municipal Corporations, p. 137 supra.
Negligence-Duty to Inspect-Discharge by Contract. In Reeder v. Western Gas
& Power Co., 42 Wn.2d 542, 255 P.2d 825 (1953), plaintiff installed his own gas
pipes. The defendant gas company installed its tanks. Plaintiff signed an agreement
that the gas company had no duty to inspect. The company acquired knowledge of
facts from which it should have known that there was a danger of an explosion. There
was an explosion. Held: The installer of a dangerous substance has a duty to inspect
customer installed pipes when he has knowledge of facts which indicate that a serious
danger exists. Public policy prevents him from contracting this duty away when he
has knowledge of such facts.
Contributory Negligence-To Look is Not to See. In Hines v. Neuner, 42 Wn.2d
116, 253 P.2d 945 (1953), where a pedestrian stumbled over a tow rope stretched
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across a crosswalk between the automobiles of the defendants, an instruction was given
as follows: "In the eyes of the law, a person will not be heard to say that he did not
see an object which he plainly could have seen had he looked. The situation from a
legal point of view is the same as though he had looked and seen the object. When
the law requires a person to look, it places upon such person the duty of seeing and
observing." The instruction was held prejudicial error as indicating to the jury that
it is contributory negligence, under all circumstances, to fail to perceive that which
is discoverable by the use of one's senses, and in effect took the question of contributory
negligence from the jury.
TRUSTS
Support Trust-Clams of Children and Divorced Wife of Bene-
ficiary. Seattle First National Bank v. Crosby' is a case of first im-
pression in Washington on the problems involved in support trusts. The
testamentary trust provided that the trustee should pay over such part
of the income as might be necessary or required for the education,
support and maintenance of the beneficiary, the son of the testatrix,
until he attained the age of thirty-five years at which time the bene-
ficiary was to receive the corpus plus accumulated income. The will
further provided that should the beneficiary die before reaching the
age of thirty-five, his heirs at law would receive his share. After the
death of the testatrix the beneficiary married and had two children.
Subsequently, his wife obtained a divorce. A property settlement
agreement was incorporated in the interlocutory decree of divorce
under which the beneficiary promised to make monthly payments to
the wife for her own support and for the support of the children until
distribution of the trust and to secure this obligation the beneficiary
assigned to the wife his interest in the trust income. The beneficiary
also assigned stated percentages of his interest in the trust corpus to
his wife individually and to her and aonther as trustees for his children.
The trustee sought a declaratory judgment of the effect of the assign-
ment and the claims of the divorced, wife and children. It was held that
the trustee had no duty nor right to comply with the assignment of
the income to the wife, this being a trust for support from income only
and the beneficiary having no interest in the income which he could
assign. The court further held that the intention of the testatrix as
evidenced by the terms of the will was that reasonable support be pro-
vided not only for her son, the beneficiary, but also for his family and
that the children's right to support" existed irrespective of any assign-
ment of income. The trustee was therefore instructed to pay from the
142 Wn.2d 234, 254 P2d 732, noted in 52 MIce. L. Rzv. 622 (1953).
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